Th is essay addresses a question raised by Helmut Pape: "What logical, semiotical and mental structure does our consciousness have to have in order to establish the proper link between perception, thought and propositional content expressed by indicators?" Th e answer, it is proposed, is found in Peirce's Existential Graphs (EG). First, EG is, itself, a model of cognition that provides the formal structure required for such a consciousness. Second, an appropriate semiotical interpretation will give us the requested structure. Th ird, interpreted as a psychological or perceptual model, EG will represent the links we seek.
structures of consciousness that undergird or constitute our capacity for indexical reference.
As we consider Pape's question further, more complexity emerges. Th e focus of the interrogation is on the structural conditions required for the proper link between perception, thought and propositional content expressed by indicators. It is not clear precisely what linkage is under scrutiny. Presumably by "propositional content expressed by indicators" Pape has in mind objects of indexical reference, but it is doubtful that, for Peirce, such objects should be regarded as the contents of propositions unless the objects are themselves propositional (or semiotical). To say of indices that they express propositional content, if what is meant by propositional content is external objects of reference, seems to involve either a non-Peircean conception of indices or a non-Peircean conception of content. It seems to me that the pure Peircean index does not express any content at all -that, in fact, may be the key to unravelling the mystery of its function.
Of course it is true that indices themselves are usually parts of, or contents of, propositions, and certainly any successful operating intelligence requires the proper interlinking of indexically loaded contents -both between perceptions and thought and between diff erent thoughts. How in consciousness we manage to keep these links straight is a diff erent question from how we consciously link with external objects. Th e fi rst concerns the interlinkages between intellectual or mental entities (index to index) while the second concerns the more basic links between the intellect and the world external to it.
It is likely that Pape intended his question to be general enough to encompass all of these issues, which must be intricately interwoven in any satisfying philosophy of language (or cognitive science). What seems called for is a model that represents the architecture or the functional-relational structure that has to be postulated of consciousness to account for the crucial role played by indices in linking perception with thought and with non-linguistic or non-semiotic objects of thought. One way to answer Pape's question is indexically; I could point to such a model, if indeed a good model of this sort has already been developed, and, to some extent, that is what I will do. But hopefully what I have to say will be more informative than a mere index could be of the structural model I will off er.
Before turning to structural considerations, I want to review some of the things Peirce said about indexicality. When I think of a Peircean index, I think of the link between thought or language and the non-linguistic so-called external world: where we fi nd the objects (or from a diff erent point of view, the subjects) of our thought. Consider the following little story from a manuscript Peirce wrote in 1893 (from MS 595, entitled "Th e Short Logic"):
Suppose two men meet upon a country road and one of them says to the other, "Th e chimney of that house is on fi re". Th e other looks about him and descries a house with green blinds and a verandah having a smoking chimney. He walks on a few miles and meets a second traveler. Like a Simple Simon he says, "Th e chimney of that house is on fi re". "What house?" asks the other. "Oh, a house with green blinds and a verandah, " replies the simpleton. "Where is the house?" asks the stranger. He desires some index which shall connect his apprehension with the house meant. Words alone cannot do this. Th e demonstrative pronouns, "this" and "that", are indices. For they call upon a hearer to use his powers of observation, and so establish a real connection between his mind and the object; and if the demonstrative pronoun does that -without which its meaning is not understood -it goes to establish such a connection; and so is an index. (CP 2.287) Th e key lesson of this little tale seems to be that we cannot make the link Pape has in mind by intellectual means alone. Words will not do the trick, not unless those words transcend their intellectual value to put us in direct contact (or at any rate, in a real relation) with the referent object or circumstance. If we cannot make the link between thoughts and external objects then we really can't have a robust semantics at all -this seems implicit in Peirce's story. We do not have to know what house is at issue to see that the simpleton's sentence is well-formed and to understand the general idea of it; but unless a real connection is established between the sentence and some particular house it will be a failed sentence with no reference. Th is is enough to call into question some popular research strategies in psychology and cognitive science that are based on the idea that we can learn everything there is to know about intelligence by studying individual minds and nervous systems without attending at all to interactions with external objects.
I do not mean to suggest that Peirce stood alone in this view or that it was decidedly new. Peirce came fully to this view in the mid-1880s when he began to emphasize that "the actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any description", but, as he pointed out, it is a position essentially present in Kant's Critique (or Critik, as Peirce preferred). Th is doctrine that "the actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any description", has far-reaching consequences for language and logic, and Peirce was clever and persistent in following out these consequences. One important consequence that Peirce discovered was the need for pronouns and indices.
Th e picture that begins to emerge is of sentences or propositions that contain pointing words, words that properly fulfi ll some grammatical function in a complete sentence but which somehow transcend that role to actually put the hearer in touch with external objects. Certainly this fi ts the function of demonstrative words like 'that' and 'there'. But even demonstratives can successfully point only when they are used in appropriate contexts with hearers who are properly oriented. To say that such words transcend their grammatical or linguistic function means that they are not mere symbols, having only conventional links with their objects of reference: they are also, and for us, more importantly, indices.
It might be helpful at this point to review Peirce's classifi cation of signs with respect to their relation types to referent objects. For this review I will quote part of a paragraph from the Harvard edition of Peirce's writings (in this passage Peirce uses the word 'representamen' to designate 'sign' in the broadest possible sense):
An icon is a representamen which fulfi lls the function of a representamen by virtue of a character which it possesses in itself, and would possess just the same though its object did not exist. Th us, the statue of a centaur is not, it is true, a representamen if there be no such thing as a centaur. Still, if it represents a centaur, it is by virtue of its shape; and this shape it will have, just as much, whether there be a centaur or not. An index is a representamen which fulfi lls the function of a representamen by virtue of a character which it could not have if its object did not exist, but which it will continue to have just the same whether it be interpreted as a representamen or not. For instance, an old-fashioned hygrometer is an index. For it is so contrived as to have a physical reaction with dryness and moisture in the air, so that the little man will come out if it is wet, and this would happen just the same if the use of the instrument should be entirely forgotten, so that it ceased actually to convey any information. A symbol is a representamen which fulfi lls its function regardless of any similarity or analogy with its object and equally regardless of any factual connection therewith, but solely and simply because it will be interpreted to be a representamen. Such for example is any general word, sentence, or book. (CP 5.73) I have included Peirce's characterization of icons and symbols because I will continue to refer to them, but it is mainly the index that concerns us. Th e index, Peirce says, would not have its character if its object did not exist. Why? Because it is fundamentally a reactional sign, dependent as a sign on some real or factual connection with its object. Why is a weather vane an index and not an icon. Because the plane of the weather vane is not independent of the direction of the wind, as it would be were it an icon. It is of the essence of a weather vane that it lie in the plane of the direction of the wind as a direct result of the wind itself. As a reactional sign, it may seem that an index involves only a causal relationship of a mechanical or effi cient variety, but Peirce denies this. While mechanical (or dyadic) causality is crucial to the indexical function, the semiotic action that is performed in indexical semiosis is mental, just as it is with any sign. Th at means that if you put your hygrometer away in your attic and forget about it, it may continue to function mechanically, so that it could convey information and thus function as an index, but insofar as it is forgotten and out of sight and mind it ceases to be one. Perhaps a better example is an ordinary thermometer. It is common to fi nd thermostatic regulation put forward as a minimal case of mental action because it seems to be goal directed. Peirce agrees that goal directedness, or as he prefers, fi nal causation, is a mark of the mental. But he denies that a thermometer as such is an index, or that thermostatic regulation is mental. Again quoting from the Harvard edition:
[T]he rise of the mercury in an ordinary thermometer or the bending of the double strip of metal in a metallic thermometer is an indication, or, to use the technical term, is an index, of an increase of atmospheric temperature, which, nevertheless, acts upon it in a purely brute and dyadic way. In these cases, however, a mental representation of the index is produced which mental representation is called the immediate object of the sign, and this object does triadically produce the intended, or proper, eff ect of the sign strictly by means of another mental sign; and that this triadic character of the action is regarded as essential is shown by the fact that if the thermometer is dynamically connected with the heating and cooling apparatus, so as to check either eff ect, we do not, in ordinary parlance speak of there being any semeiosy, or action of a sign, but, on the contrary, say that there is an "automatic regulation", an idea opposed, in our minds, to that of semeiosy. For the proper signifi cate outcome of a sign, I propose the name, the interpretant of a sign. (CP 5.473) In other words, the proper signifi cate outcome of an index is an interpretant, usually a conception or thought of some sort, but one whose intellectual value is dependent on its existential situation vis-à-vis its referent object.
We can now give a preliminary answer to one of the questions raised earlier: How is it possible for perception and thought to be properly linked to the external world? Consider again Peirce's story about the house with the burning chimney. Upon being told, "Th e chimney of that house is on fi re", Peirce's Simple Simon looked around to fi nd the alleged house. Th e "that" in the sentence indicated that the referent house was in the vicinity. Upon spying a house with a smoking chimney, the simpleton took it to be the house referred to in the sentence and judged that its chimney was on fi re. Th e simpleton had begun with a conception or thought that a house in the vicinity had a burning chimney, looked around for a sign, perceived a smoking chimney, took it as an index of a chimney fi re, and thus judged that that was the house he had been told about. Here we fi nd perception and thought clearly connected to each other and with the external world, and the links that bring them all together appear to be the indexical 'that' in the sentence and the perceived smoke taken (indexically) to be a sign of fi re. Whether these linkages are proper largely depends on whether the smoking chimney really is the burning chimney and this can be determined by further investigation. When the simpleton met another traveller, miles from the referent house, and repeated the sentence he had himself been told, "Th e chimney of that house is on fi re", the traveller, not properly situated relative to the house, could not pick it out. Neither the indexical 'that' nor the descriptive information in the sentence were suffi cient to create a real relation between what Peirce called the traveller's apprehension and the house the simpleton had in mind. Th e additional information that the house had green blinds and a verandah could not help because of the distance separating the traveller from the house, unless the traveller had already seen the house and remembered these attributes as distinctive. Had that been that the case, the information that the house had green blinds and a verandah would itself have been an index for the traveller. But in the story, the traveller is left befuddled, without any way to link up the idea of a house with a burning chimney with an actual house. Still, we are left with a clear sense that all that is needed is a suitable index, such as: "Starting from this point, go south fi ve miles to the great willow tree at the fork of the road, and look to the west. Th ere you will see the house I have told you about". So it appears that perception and thought can be properly linked to the external world through the bridging function of indices and the ability and willingness of the perceiver/conceiver to engage in active observation of his environment.
What can be said about the structure of consciousness that is necessary in order to sustain the proper links between perceptions and thoughts or between thoughts themselves? Th ese are the index to index links I referred to above. Th e wording of Pape's question suggests that propositions containing indices are key to this problematic, and I think he is right. For Peirce every proposition is made up of a logical subject and a logical predicate, not equivalent to grammatical subjects and predicates. Th e logical predicate is a sort of image or picture, iconic in nature, that essentially conveys the content of the proposition. Peirce usually depicts the logical predicate of a proposition as a sentence with the names (including pronouns) blanked out. For example, " [blank] of [blank] is on fi re" would be the logical predicate of the sentence "Th e chimney of that house is on fi re". Th e logical subjects (or objects) are the referents of the names we insert in the blanks to make a complete sentence. In his defi nition of 'proposition' for the Century Dictionary, Peirce claimed that the subjects of a proposition "cannot be suffi ciently indicated by any general description, but only by a real junction with experience, as by a fi nger-pointing". So we can divide propositions, which as complex signs are symbols, into logical subjects and predicates of which the predicates are icons and the subjects are indices. Th is suggests that the points of connection between intellectual or conceptual entities are made at the place of the logical subjects of propositions.
I have now covered the main Peircean ideas about indexicality that will have to be refl ected or incorporated in the structure of any consciousness suffi ciently developed to meet the indexical conditions Pape laid out in his question. I believe that an interesting architecture for such a consciousness was designed by Peirce himself in his system of logical graphs called the Existential Graphs (EG). Peirce actually designed EG to model thought in action, as he said; today this work might fall under the rubric of formal cognitive science (or logic of cognition). Since the late 1970s, John Sowa has been developing a system of conceptual graphs, based on Peirce's EG, and Sowa's system has been the subject of intensive research for several years. Th e group doing this research seems convinced that EG provides the best basic logic for a formal model of natural language and cognition. Th is conforms nicely with Peirce's intention for his graphs, and it lends support to the claim that EG is not just another system of formal logic with an unusual syntax.
2
In what follows I will present EG in its bare essentials, giving just enough to provide "the general idea" and to show why I think EG promises to be a rich model of the structures Pape asked about. My description of EG as a formal system of logic comes almost entirely (and much of it word for word) from the writings of Don D. Roberts. 3 EG is a complete and consistent treatment of the logic of propositions and the logic of quantifi ers. It is distinguished from most other systems of logic by its twodimensional syntax and by its small number of special symbols.
Th e primitive symbols of EG are: (1) a two-dimensional surface on which graphs are to be placed, called the 'sheet of assertion' (SA);
(2) a self-returning fi nely drawn line, , called the 'cut'; (3) a heavily drawn line, , called the 'line of identity', or 'line' for short; and (4) an infi nite supply of spots with no hooks, an infi nite supply of spots with one hook, an infi nite supply of spots with two hooks, and so on.
Th e sheet of assertion (SA) is the surface used by the graphist; it is usually a sheet of paper, a blackboard, or a computer screen. It represents the universe of discourse -the sum total of all that is to be referred to or reasoned about. Sometimes Peirce imagined books of these sheets of assertion, each representing separate modalities or diff erent universes of discourse. For this work, I have my book of sheets open to the universe of actuality -the universe of most common discourse. A cut is used to separate, or fence off , part of the sheet of assertion for separate treatment.
2 See especially Sowa 1976 Sowa , 1984 Sowa , 1997 Sowa , 2000 Th e fullest presentation of Peirce's Existential Graphs is given in Roberts 1973, but I have found Roberts 1967 and 1992 to be extremely useful expositions.
To understand the part of EG I am presenting, it is important to know what Peirce meant by 'spot', 'line' and 'hook', but before I take up those terms I want to explain what he meant by 'graph'. According to Roberts, the word 'graph' is used in a technical sense, to denote the EG analogue of 'legitimate sentence' or 'well-formed formula'. Th ere are fi ve formation rules that determine the class of graphs:
(1) Any part of the blank SA is a graph.
(2) Any unattached line of identity is a graph.
(3) If P is a graph, cut-P ( ) is a graph.
(4) If P is a spot with n hooks, then both and are graphs.
(5) If P and Q are graphs, then P Q (in juxtaposition) is a graph.
A graph is anything written or drawn (scribed) on the sheet of assertion if it is wellformed. Whatever is written unenclosed on SA is asserted to be true of the universe represented by SA. Roberts says we can think of what we write on SA as making the representation of the universe of discourse more determinate. So if we scribe Th e chimney of that house is on fi re.
on SA, we are asserting that proposition to be true. Th is is a graph. If we enclose this graph in a cut, thereby scribing a diff erent graph, we deny that the chimney of that house is on fi re. Graphs are strictly read from the outside in (endoporeutically) so that this graph would be strictly read "It is false that the chimney of that house is on fi re". But it is typical to give an equivalent but more user-friendly reading, such as, "Th e chimney of that house is not on fi re". Now I will turn to spots, lines, and hooks, and it will not take long to begin to see the relevance to the general topic of this paper. (I continue to rely heavily on Roberts' expositions of EG.)
Let an underlined extended blank space [__________] "be used to mark the place of a noun which has been erased from a proposition. A blank form of proposition produced by such erasures as can be fi lled, each with a proper name or noun or noun phrase, to make a proposition again, will be called a spot, or, relatively to the proposition of which it is conceived to be a part, the predicate of that proposition." Th ese are some examples of spots: Any analysis of a proposition will show it to have only one predicate, but because the analysis of propositions can proceed in several diff erent ways, diff erent analyses will produce diff erent predicates. Th us, the proposition "Drinking coff ee brings pleasure to some people" may be considered as having for its predicate any of the following eight spots:
[__________] brings [__________] Note that the entire proposition may be considered a predicate.
A subject of a proposition is any part of the proposition which might be replaced by a proper name, and still leave the proposition a proposition. Th is distinguishes the logical subject from what grammarians call the subject.
In EG, spots containing blanks do not count as graphs, because they do not express propositions. Obviously spots can be turned back into propositions by reinserting the erased nouns or noun phrases, or we could replace the blanks with proper names. We can also turn the spots into propositions by replacing the blanks with lines of identity, where the lines function somewhat like indexical nouns. When the blanks are replaced with lines of identity the distinction between subjects and predicate remains perspicuous. A line of identity denotes the existence of a single, individual (but otherwise undesignated) object in the universe of discourse. A line of identity by itself on the sheet of assertion is a graph, and therefore represents a proposition. It may be read simply as "Something exists", which is true as long as there is at least one thing in the universe. Lines can come in any length or shape and can branch off to attach to any number of spots. Lines are attached to spots by hooks that the spots are assumed to have in appropriate places. So if we take the four predicates:
[blank] is that house [blank] has [blank] [blank] is a chimney [blank] is on fi re and attach lines of identity in place of the blanks, we get Now we have four graphs [propositions] which we may imagine to be juxtaposed on the same sheet of assertion. By the rules of the graphs, juxtaposition represents conjunction, so these four propositions become a compound graph which we can read as: "Something is that house, and something has something, and something is a chimney, and something is on fi re". If we connect some of the lines to consolidate the apparent excess of individuals we will recognize the form of the sentence we have been dealing with from Peirce's story:
Th is graph may be read "Something, which is that house, has something that is a chimney and it is on fi re", but a more natural reading is "Th e chimney of that house is on fi re".
Th is is about all that is necessary for my purposes here, but for a somewhat more complete sense of the system I'll add one more EG form, the scroll:
. It is a cut within a cut [physically stretched out] and would be read "It is false that it is false that". Any graph on the inmost area, in other words, would be doubly negated, as long as there were no graph on the once enclosed area. For example, can be read "Not not P" which is equivalent to P. But would be read, endoporeutically, as "Not (P and not Q)" where what is being denied is the conjunction of P and not Q. Th is is, of course, equivalent to the conditional expression, "If P then Q". In EG, the scroll is in fact the sign of material implication. Whatever is in the once enclosed area is the antecedent and whatever is in the twice enclosed area is the consequent. When we add lines of identity to our graphs, we quantify them. Th e simple graph is on fi re, which is unenclosed, is existentially quantifi ed. It tells us that "Something is on fi re". If we add a line of identity to the conditional graph by connecting a spot R with a spot S, we get a universally quantifi ed expression: "Whatever is R is S" or "All R's are S's". Th e rule is that if a line has its outermost extremity on an unenclosed area (the SA) or on any evenly enclosed area, it acts as an existential quantifi er, while lines whose outermost extremities lie on oddly enclosed areas act as universal quantifi ers. To this partial basis (and I have left out a great deal) Peirce added two axioms, A1 Th e blank sheet of assertion A2 Th e unattached line of identity and fi ve rules of inference (or transformation)
R1 Th e rule of erasure R2 Th e rule of insertion R3 Th e rule of iteration R4 Th e rule of deiteration R5 Th e rule of the double cut which gives us a complete and consistent system of fi rst order logic. 4 (Here ends my heavy reliance on the Roberts' work.) Suppose now that we entertain briefl y the idea that EG is the structural model we are looking for in answer to Pape's leading question for this symposium. How could we represent the linkage between perception, thought, and propositional content expressed by indicators? It seems to me that spots in EG, non-(or pre-)propositional logical predicates, might be taken to correspond to percepts.
5 As soon as we succeed in attaching (associating) a spot (or percept) with a line of identity (an individual) we have obtained a proposition (a perceptual judgment). Now, presumably, thought involves a concerted movement or development from proposition to proposition (or from sign to sign), in some way under the guidance of rules (or habits) of inference. EG provides an excellent representation of such a development of thought. As an exclusive feature it off ers the line of identity which models the indexical links we are looking for between intellectual entities. Consider again the graph, Peirce's account of perception, somewhat oversimplifi ed, was that it is a process involving percepts and perceptual judgments, where percepts are felt but not thought, and where perceptual judgments are intellectual pronouncements (propositional in form) responsive to percepts (CP 7.615ff and Hookway 1985: 156ff ) . It is the vast accumulation of perceptual judgments, interrelated and refi ned by years of experience and thinking, that constitutes the contents of a mind -or as we sometimes say, one's thought.
But since it is understood that only one house is under consideration (wherever it may be) the lines of identity attached to "is a/that house" would be attached to each other and the duplicate spot could be erased. Th e resulting graph would look like this:
In a similar way premisses can be introduced, combined, modifi ed, and otherwise transformed by the rules of EG, enabling us to reach conclusions that are distant from their premisses, without ever losing the indexical connectedness of the individuals we are reasoning about. But what about the links between the graphs and the world external to the graphs (corresponding to the links between intellectual systems and the external world)? Admittedly that is more problematic. Of course the lines of identity do represent individuals in the external world (assuming that that is the world represented by our sheet of assertion), but only aft er the fashion of demonstrative pronouns. But even that overstates the case, for lines of identity act as quantifi ers and therefore cannot even achieve the force of a pronoun. Th e fact is, graphs cannot make actual contact 6 How the graphist is able to match up lines of identity in scribing premisses in the fi rst place is, I acknowledge, a vexed question, but it is part of the more general problem of how we can safely assert premisses (especially contingent premisses). I believe that Peirce's logic of abduction is fundamental for this initial stage of argumentation but I cannot pursue this question here. Psychologically, the problem concerns how we are able to recognize identity across time and space. with the world any more easily than ordinary sentences can; they too have to resort to defi nite descriptions and demonstratives. You may have noticed that when I scribed the sentence "Th e chimney of that house is on fi re", I included the indexical 'that' in the graph: I scribed " is that house" instead of " is a house". It is by virtue of such defi nite indexical expressions that we can connect our graphs with the external world, but they do not make that connection for us -they call on us to rise up, to move our bodies, to use our powers of observation to fi nd the place in the world they are pointing to. In a paper entitled "Critic of Arguments" Peirce told a variant of the story given above:
Two men meet on a country road. One says to the other, "that house is on fi re". "What house?" "Why, the house about a mile to my right. " Let this speech be taken down and shown to anybody in the neighboring village, and it will appear that the language by itself does not fi x the house. But the person addressed sees where the speaker is standing, recognizes his right hand side [...] estimates a mile [...] and looking there, sees a house. It is not the language alone, with its mere associations of similarity, but the language taken in connection with the auditor's own experiential associations of contiguity, which determines for him what house is meant. It is requisite then, in order to show what we are talking or writing about, to put the hearer's or reader's mind into real, active connection with the concatenation of experience or of fi ction with which we are dealing, and, further, to draw his attention to, and identify, a certain number of particular points in such a concatenation. If there be a reader who cannot understand my writings, let me tell him that no straining of his mind will help him: his whole diffi culty is that he has no personal experience of the world of problems of which I am talking, and he might as well close the book until such experience comes. (CP 3. 419) Peirce's point about the necessity for experience in order to make the critical link between the world of intellect and the world outside intellect is so important I am tempted to stop here, but I want to tie up one or two loose ends. Peirce's EG gives us a general model for representing the indexical linkings in perception and thought that can be represented iconically (that is done with lines of identity), and the graphs can accommodate the pointing words and descriptions that we need to connect our thoughts with their appropriate objects, but how does EG help us answer Pape's leading question: What logical (or formal), semiotical, and mental (or psychological) structure does our consciousness have to have in order to establish the links we are concerned with?
Th e answer is that EG gives us a basic structure that applies under diff erent interpretations in all three cases. First, EG is, itself, a model of cognition that provides the formal structure required for such a consciousness. Second, an appropriate semiotical interpretation will give us the requested semiotical structure. I cannot develop this interpretation here, but it would probably identify spots with immediate objects, graphs with symbols, transformed graphs with interpretants, and the external objects represented by lines of identity or pointed to by the demonstrative expressions with dynamic objects. Transformations would represent semiosis. Th ird, interpreted as a psychological or perceptual model, EG will again, I believe, represent the links we are aft er. Spots will be identifi ed with percepts, spots attached to lines with perceptual judgments, graphs in general would be identifi ed with beliefs (or with intellectual entities expressible as propositions), and graphical transformations with thought processes.
I have fi nished with a mere sketch. I do not pretend to have worked out these interpretations suffi ciently to have proved their legitimacy, but I think they are promising and I hope to have shown that much.
Let me conclude with a remark on my title: "Being in the World". Some readers may have expected a little Heideggerian interlude, and in fact I had picked out a quotation from Heidegger and another from Husserl to underscore Peirce's admonition that we must confront the world of existence or else close the book.
7 But I will say only this. Notice that on every interpretation of EG, or that part of it I have recommended as our model of consciousness, there is nothing that can be scribed without a line of identity. In a word, there is nothing we can scribe, nothing we can say, nothing we can think, nothing we can perceive that is not attached to a line that represents some being in the world represented by the sheet of assertion. Th is was a core belief for Peirce and is a key to his brand of pragmatism. 
